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Abstract In this paper we assess the joint impact of biometric and financial risk 
on the market valuation of life insurance liabilities. We consider a stylized, 
contingent claim based model of a life insurance company issuing participating 
contracts and sub-ject to default risk, as pioneered by Briys and de Varenne (Geneva 
Pap Risk Insur The-ory 19(1):53–72, 1994, J Risk Insur 64(4):673–694, 1997), and 
build on their model by explicitly introducing biometric risk and its components, 
namely diversifiable and system-atic risk. The contracts considered include pure 
endowments, deferred whole life annui-ties and guaranteed annuity options. Our 
results stress the predominance of systematic over diversifiable risk in determining fair 
participation rates. We investigate the interac-tion of contract design, market regimes 
and mortality assumptions, and show that, par-ticularly for lifelong benefits, the choice 
of the participation rate must be very conserva-tive if longevity improvements are 
foreseeable.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, increasing volatility in investment returns coupled with low 
interest rates regimes and increased expectation of life across all developed coun-
tries have impacted on life insurance and pension markets, resulting in potential dis-
tress for some annuity providers.
The adoption of fair value based accounting standards for insurers, e.g. the full 
implementation of the Solvency II framework in the European Union in 2016, has 
enhanced the transparency of their balance sheets by tying assets and liabilities val-
ues to the actual (or hypothetical) price they could be exchanged for in a liquid mar-
ket. On the other hand, the application of these accounting standards has stressed the 
exposure of life insurers’ balance sheets to a variety of financial and biometric fac-
tors, with a consequent effect on capital requirements. This is particularly relevant 
for providers of long-term investment guarantees or lifelong benefits. Traditional 
life insurance products offering fixed life contingencies have been replaced long ago 
by more competitive contract structures, with-profits in the UK and participating 
policies in Europe and the US, where insurers share part of their returns with poli-
cyholders. Usually, the policyholder is promised to receive a minimum return even 
when market performance is poor. This minimum rate of return is set at issuance 
on a very conservative basis, so that the implicit value of such a guarantee is small. 
However, given the long-term nature of the contract, guarantees that are initially far 
out of the money may become highly valuable due to adverse movements in market 
rates of return and unexpected rise in the length of life. The increasing cost of these 
guarantees could become unsustainable and eventually compromise the financial 
stability of their provider. A notable example is given by Equitable Life, the world’s 
oldest life insurer, see [2, 11, 18] for other examples of insolvencies in the life insur-
ance industry. Therefore, an accurate contract design and careful assessment of all 
the risks involved, along with the interaction between them, are crucial.
The aim of this paper is to assess the joint impact of biometric and financial risk 
on the market valuation of life insurance liabilities. We explicitly incorporate lon-
gevity risk on a portfolio level in the stylized, contingent claim model of a life insur-
ance company issuing participating contracts and subject to default risk pioneered 
by [11, 12] and extended, e.g., by [1, 4, 5, 7, 14, 18].
This stream of literature focuses on financial risks only, as it is implicitly assumed 
that diversifiable biometric risk can be completely eliminated by pooling a large 
portfolio and systematic biometric risk, that is longevity risk, is absent. Beyond pure 
endowments, the participating contracts we consider are deferred whole life annui-
ties and guaranteed annuity options. Longevity risk has been emphasized as a main 
factor affecting life insurance portfolios only in relatively recent years. Stochastic 
mortality models have been developed to explicitly allow for the uncertainty sur-
rounding future survival rates, see [6] for an overview. The pioneering model of [21] 
has been successfully applied to forecast mortality of different populations and has 
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been extended and improved in several ways, see e.g. [13] and references therein. 
In our stylized framework we follow a slightly different approach and introduce a 
stochastic force of mortality obtained by randomly rescaling a deterministic inten-
sity. This relatively simple formulation allows to clearly separate process risk, repre-
sented by the randomness in the times of death of policyholders, from the systematic 
risk captured by the random rescaling factor.
We conduct a thorough analysis of contract components and fair participation 
rates, exploring in detail the interplay of guarantees, market regimes, mortality 
assumptions and portfolio sizes. The main results of the paper can be summarized as 
follows: first, idiosyncratic biometric risk vanishes even in small portfolios. In other 
words, when homogeneous contracts are pooled together, diversification becomes 
fully effective with relatively small portfolio sizes. Further, longevity risk has a very 
substantial impact on the market value of the participating life insurance liabilities. 
We show that the relative size of this impact on the fair participation coefficients 
is particularly relevant when systematic biometric risk is paired with a low interest 
rate environment, and is preserved when the solvency capital or the pricing rule is 
adjusted to reflect the portfolio size. This effect has been pointed out by a number 
of studies: e.g. [20, 25] for pension annuities; [3, 26] for pension plans and annui-
ties including guaranteed annuity conversion options; [17, 22] in the context of tra-
ditional/fixed life insurance and annuities products, and [16] for variable annuities 
with lifetime withdrawal guarantees. Finally, our detailed analysis provides some 
useful guidance on the possible actions a life insurer could take in order to mitigate 
the effect of longevity risk.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the con-
tract structure, the modelling of insurance and financial risk and the extension 
to a large portfolio. Section  3 focuses on the market valuation of the outstanding 
liabilities, unbundling them into different components. Section 4 shows how ruin-
probability-based capital requirements can be set under our framework. Section 5 is 
devoted to the numerical analysis and addresses the issue of fair pricing.
Section  6 provides some concluding remarks and a short outlook on possible 
extensions. Proofs and technical results are collected in the Appendices.
2  Model setup
At time t = 0 the life insurance company’s capital structure can be synthesized 
through the following simplified balance sheet: 
Assets Liabilities
W0 E0 = (1 − 훼)W0
L0 = 훼W0
W0 W0
 Hence, the initial assets W0 of the firm are financed by two groups of stakeholders. 
A share 훼 of the assets (with 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1 ) is contributed by N0 policyholders that are 
homogeneous, with the same age x at inception, and are entitled to the same benefits. 
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Therefore, each policyholder pays a single premium L0∕N0 = 훼W0∕N0 , where L0 is 
the overall premium contribution. The remaining fraction 1 − 훼 is provided by equi-
tyholders, whose total contribution is (1 − 훼)W0 = E0 . Clearly, initial assets W0 and 
premium income L0 are related to the portfolio size N0.
Since we explicitly allow for insurance risk, the outstanding liability at any given 
time will depend, among other factors, on the demographic evolution of the popula-
tion of policyholders. However, if all insurance risk can be diversified, for instance 
when the portfolio is large and there is no systematic risk, then the pool of homoge-
neous contracts could be treated as a purely financial contract with initial contribu-
tion L0 . This point will be picked up again later.
2.1  Contract structure
Through their initial investment in the company, policyholders alive at the maturity 
T of the contract have a claim on the firm’s assets. Moreover, we assume that the 
insurance company issues no further debt, raises no capital and pays no dividends to 
equityholders before the contract’s maturity. Since profits distribution is a common 
feature of many life insurance contracts, we consider the following version of a par-
ticipating policy. As we will see, this apparently simple specification encompasses 
different types of guarantees.
Denote by L and W = W0eR the total liability, respectively the assets value, at 
time T, where R is the assets log-return over the period [0, T]. At maturity, the total 
outstanding liability the insurance company has to meet depends on the number of 
alive policyholders N:
where 1 is the indicator of the event  . Then, in the very unlikely case in which 
no policyholder survives the maturity T, i.e. N = 0,1 the company has no liability 
outstanding. Otherwise, if N > 0 , the liability depends on the assets value W and the 
global payoff G guaranteed to surviving policyholders, and is defined as in [11, 12] 
by
L =
{
Ψ if N > 0
0 if N = 0
= Ψ1{N>0},
Ψ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
W if W < G
G if G ≤ W ≤ G
𝛼𝛼
G + 𝛿𝛿(𝛼𝛼W − G) if
G
𝛼𝛼
< W
,
1 The probability that a portfolio be completely extinct at maturity is negligible for usual ages and 
maturities and reasonable portfolio sizes. For instance, with a survival probability of 95% (which may be 
common for a 40-years old policyholder and a 20 years horizon), the probability of extinction is less than 
10−6 for a group of 5 individuals. When the survival probability is only 50% , the extinction probability is 
less than 10−6 for a group of 20 individuals.
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or, more compactly, by
where 훿 ∈ [0, 1] denotes the participation coefficient. Note that the global payoff G 
guaranteed to surviving policyholders is stochastic since it is proportional to N, that 
is
where the individual guaranteed benefit B may depend on other financial or demo-
graphic factors and therefore may be random as well. By suitably specifying G (i.e. 
B) we will obtain different types of provisions payable in case of survival.
In (2.1) three components can be identified: the stochastic guarantee G, the 
payoff of a call option and that of a shorted put option. Both options are written 
on the assets of the firm and have a stochastic exercise price depending on G. The 
call option corresponds to a terminal bonus payment and is usually referred to as 
the bonus option. The participation coefficient 훿 is the share of the surpluses the 
policyholders are entitled to as bonus. The shorted put option results from the 
fact that equityholders have limited liability and is usually known as the default 
option. Unlike the existing literature, this payoff not only depends on the value 
of financial assets but also on the evolution of the cohort of policyholders under 
scrutiny and possibly on the realization of demographic risk factors that drive 
future survival probabilities. The assets W, if insufficient, i.e. W < G , will be 
shared among surviving policyholders. If G ≤ W  , each surviving policyholder 
will be entitled to the guaranteed amount B and to an additional lump sum bonus 
if further 𝛼𝛼W > G.
Note that the equityholders’ payoff at maturity is residually given by
In the present paper we discuss the following alternative specifications for the indi-
vidual guaranteed benefit B:
(a) B = b;
(b) B = 휌 aT;
(c) B = b +
[
b 휌g aT − b
]+
= b max
{
1, 휌g aT
}
.
Case (a) characterizes pure endowments, where the guarantee is fixed and the 
individual benefit B is therefore deterministic. We could alternatively consider 
a stochastic benefit depending on the assets values or some other market related 
variable.
In case (b) the contracts sold are deferred whole life annuities guaranteeing 
each survivor the continuous payment at rate 휌 per year, starting at time T. The 
(2.1)Ψ = G + 훿훼
[
W −
G
훼
]+
− [G −W]+,
G = NB,
(2.2)W − L = W1{N=0} + [W − G]+1{N>0} − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿
[
W −
G
𝛿𝛿
]+
1{N>0}.
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quantity aT is the market value at time T of an immediate whole life annuity mak-
ing continuous payments at unitary rate to a life then aged x + T  . If the market 
rate aT were deterministic, from the valuation point of view the contract would 
be equivalent to that described in case (a). However, the interesting case is when 
aT is stochastic as it depends on market conditions prevailing at time T, see “Mar-
ket value of the unitary annuity” section in Appendix where an expression for aT 
is worked out. Note that B is then the amount the insurer would need at time T 
to purchase, on the open market, an immediate annuity matching the future pay-
ments guaranteed to each policyholder.
Case (c) describes pure endowments with attached a guaranteed annuity option. 
These are contracts which provide policyholders with the right to convert, at matu-
rity, a survival benefit into an annuity at a fixed conversion rate 휌g . Conditional on 
survival, the option is exercised if the benefit b [specified as in case (a)] is less than 
the market value b 휌g aT of the guaranteed annuity. Indeed, in case the option is exer-
cised, the policyholder will receive an immediate whole life annuity making con-
tinuous payments at rate b 휌g per year. Alternatively, the individual benefit can be 
decomposed into a deferred whole life annuity, as in case (b), making continuous 
payments at rate b 휌g per year and, in addition, the option to surrender the contract at 
time T. To see this, the individual benefit can be rewritten as follows:
If the surrender option is exercised, the policyholder receives a cash amount equal to 
b (surrender value).
Although in cases (b) and (c) payments can occur after T, solvency and profit 
distribution are only assessed at the maturity date by comparing the market values of 
assets and liabilities, as in [11, 12].
It is convenient, especially when analysing (infinitely) large portfolios, to con-
sider quantities at individual, rather than global, level. As policyholders are homo-
geneous in terms of benefits, the individual liability at maturity T attributed to poli-
cyholder i is defined by
where 휏 i denotes her residual lifetime.2 In particular, the liability attributed to each 
policyholder surviving at time T is then equal to
B = b 휌g aT +
[
b − b 휌g aT
]+
.
(2.3)퓁i = L
N
1{𝜏𝜏 i>T} =
Ψ
N
1{𝜏𝜏 i>T} = 𝜓𝜓1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}, i = 1,… ,N0,
휓 = B + 훿훼
[
w −
B
훼
]+
− [B − w]+,
2 Note that the indicator of the event {N > 0} can be omitted in presence of the indicator of the event 
{𝜏𝜏 i > T}.
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with w = W
N
 , on the set {N > 0} . The interpretation of the three liability components 
remains unchanged upon considering as underlying of the options the individual 
share w of the total assets pertaining to each surviving policyholder and, in the exer-
cise price, the individual benefit B instead of the global payoff G. Of course, adding 
up the individual liabilities recovers the total liability: L = ∑N0
i=1
퓁i.
2.2  Modelling insurance risk
We start this section by observing that the insurance risk affecting our portfolio of 
homogeneous policyholders arises from the possibility of deviations between actual 
and expected mortality (survival) rates. As it happens in the case of investment port-
folios, this risk can be split into two components. The first component is given by 
the unsystematic risk, that can be diversified away through pooling. In other words, 
this risk component tends to disappear for large enough portfolios. The second com-
ponent is instead given by a systematic part that hits all policies in the same direc-
tion. In our case, this second component can be identified in the so called longevity 
risk, that is the risk of an overall unanticipated decline in mortality rates, see [6, 23]. 
When it is present, even with a large portfolio there is a residual part of risk that 
cannot be eliminated.
To model insurance risk, we consider the portfolio of N0 homogeneous poli-
cyholders (each aged x at time 0) introduced in the previous section. The insurer 
chooses, for pricing purposes, a risk neutral probability Q among the infinitely many 
equivalent martingale measures existing in incomplete arbitrage-free markets. The 
probability Q then accounts for both diversifiable and systematic risk inherent to this 
portfolio, and, in particular, can depend on its size N0 . Recall that 휏 i is the residual 
lifetime of the ith policyholder in the portfolio. The number of individuals alive in 
the group at time T is then given by
Assumption 1 Conditionally on a positive random variable Δ , the residual life-
times 휏 i, i = 1,… ,N0 , are independent, and
for any ti ≥ 0, i = 1,… ,N0 , where m is a deterministic force of mortality.3
(2.4)N =
N0∑
i=1
1{𝜏𝜏 i> T}.
Q
(
𝜏𝜏1 > t1,… , 𝜏𝜏
N0 > tN0 |Δ) = N0∏
i=1
Q
(
𝜏𝜏 i > ti|Δ) = N0∏
i=1
e−Δ ∫
ti
0
m(v)dv
3 The function m is nonnegative, continuous, and satisfies ∫ +∞
0
m(u)du = +∞.
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In other words, conditionally on Δ , the residual lifetimes 휏 i, i = 1,… ,N0 , are 
the first jump times of independent inhomogeneous Poisson processes with com-
mon stochastic intensity 𝜇𝜇t = Δm(t), t > 0 . This framework goes under the name of 
Cox (or doubly-stochastic) model, see [9, 10]. The positive random variable Δ is a 
common factor affecting all lifetimes at once and can therefore be interpreted as sys-
tematic risk. Its effect is to rescale by a random percentage the deterministic force of 
mortality m relative to a life aged x at time 0.
Assumption 2 The random variable Δ is part of the information available at the 
maturity date T.4
While the random rescaling amount is unknown at the valuation date (time 0), it 
is revealed to market participants at time T. In other words, information on demo-
graphic risk accumulated by observing mortality experience in this and similar port-
folios and/or at national population level allows insurers to resolve the uncertainty 
related to the systematic risk relative to this specific cohort of individuals. This 
static and relatively simple parametrization could be extended to a dynamic stochas-
tic mortality model which is updated as new information becomes available.
We remark that a similar multiplicative framework for the force of mortal-
ity is sometimes used, although in a different context, in frailty models in order to 
describe the heterogeneity among individuals in a life insurance portfolio, see for 
instance [19]. Our problem, instead, involves completely homogeneous individuals 
whose lifetime is subject to two layers of uncertainty: a common one due to the 
randomness of the force of mortality and a specific one resulting from the policy-
holder’s own Poisson process.
From Assumption 1, the t-years survival probability for each individual is
for t ≥ 0 and i = 1,… ,N0 . In the following we define, for y ≥ x and u ≥ 0,
so that in particular, for 0 ≤ t ≤ s , we have s−tp∗x+t = e− ∫ st m(v)dv . The latter quantity 
can be thought as the conditional survival probability of a fictitious lifetime 휏∗ of an 
individual aged x at 0 having deterministic force of mortality m. More precisely, it is 
the probability that such individual is still alive at time s conditional on survival at t. 
When E[Δ] < 1 we have E[𝜇𝜇t] < m(t) and, by Jensen inequality, tpx > tp∗x . Further, 
each lifetime 휏 i is greater than 휏∗ in the hazard rate order, see [15]. This and other 
properties are proved in “Properties of 휏i and N” section in Appendix .
tpx = Q(𝜏𝜏
i > t) = E
[
e−Δ ∫ t0 m(v)dv
]
up
∗
y
= e−
∫ u+y−x
y−x
m(v)dv
4 Formally, the random variable Δ is measurable with respect to the 휎-algebra containing the information 
available to market participants at time T.
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To shorten notation, in the following we let 휋 = Tp∗x , so that, conditional 
on Δ , N ∼ Binomial(N0,휋Δ) , while the actual T-years survival probability is 
Q(𝜏𝜏 i > T) = E[𝜋𝜋Δ].
The following figures exemplify the versatility of the model in characterizing, 
despite its simplicity, longevity risk. Figure 1 displays the survival probability tp40 , 
as a function of t, for different choices of the moments of the distribution of Δ . The 
exact details on the law of Δ and the deterministic force of mortality m employed are 
provided in Sect. 5. Note that an increase in var[Δ] has the same effect (at least in 
the case E[Δ] < 1 ) as a decrease in E[Δ] , although survival probabilities are affected 
mostly at old ages.
Figure 2 displays the percentage change in the expected residual lifetime, E[휏 i] , 
of a 40-year policyholder with respect to the expectation of the fictitious lifetime 휏∗ 
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(equal to 41.73 under the same assumptions previously used to construct Fig.  1). 
Note that when E[Δ] = 0.8, 0.4 , the expected lifetime increases by approximately 
3 and 13 years respectively. Conversely, when E[Δ] = 1.2 , the expected residual 
lifetime decreases by approximately 1 year. Moreover, the effect of var[Δ] on the 
expected residual lifetime is almost linear.
Finally, in Fig. 3 we display the density of 휋Δ = exp(−Δ ∫ 25
0
m(v)dv) , that can be 
interpreted as the 25 years stochastic survival probability for an individual aged 40 
at time 0. Although the dependence of this probability on the stochastic reduction 
factor Δ is not linear, a change in E[Δ] seems to correspond to a shift in the distribu-
tion of 휋Δ , except when E[Δ] is small, in which case the distribution is compressed 
towards its upper bound.
2.3  Modelling large portfolios risk
To represent a portfolio with a large number of homogeneous policyholders, we 
consider the insurance risk model introduced in the previous section as the portfolio 
size diverges. More precisely, we assume there are now infinitely many policyhold-
ers and, consistently with the previous notation, we denote by 휏 i the residual lifetime 
of the ith policyholder. The risk neutral measure Q now contains an adjustment for 
systematic risk only, as the portfolio size is large and unsystematic mortality risk has 
been diversified away.
For each finite sub-portfolio of size N0 , we assume the same contract and capital 
structure introduced in Sect. 2.1. In particular, initial assets W0 and premium income 
L0 depend on N0 . It follows that all quantities derived from assets and premiums 
such as individual and global liabilities, leverage ratio and assets value at time T 
depend on the sub-portfolio size as well.
The definition of N is still given by (2.4) and now provides the number of sur-
vivors at time T within the sub-portfolio of policyholders with index i = 1,… ,N0 . 
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For each N0 we keep Assumptions 1–2 under Q, so that the infinitely many random 
times 휏 i, i = 1, 2,… , are independent conditionally on Δ . It follows that
almost surely under Q, see [24].5
Note that the pricing measure Q, deterministic force of mortality m and random 
rescaling factor Δ could differ from those introduced in Sect. 2.2, relative to a finite 
portfolio. However, in this section and whenever there is no risk of misunderstand-
ing, we stick to this notation. Instead, in Sect. 5, we will stress the dependence of 
these quantities and of the corresponding symbols on the portfolio size.
With an infinite portfolio, it only makes sense to consider quantities at individual 
level. The individual liability for the large portfolio can then be defined by taking 
the limit in (2.3) as N0 → +∞ . In order to do so, an assumption on how capital 
requirements and premium ratings behave as the portfolio size grows is needed. Let 
then w0 =
W0
N0
 and 퓁0 =
L0
N0
 be the individual assets per contract, respectively individ-
ual single premium.
Assumption 3 As N0 → +∞,
It is natural to expect that, in a finite portfolio, the initial assets per contract w0 
decrease with N0 , since they must cover not only the expected individual liability 
but also its fluctuations. Then, Assumption 3 means that, once the portfolio is large 
enough for pooling to be fully effective, the assets per contract and the individual 
single premium stabilize around asymptotic values representing the individual assets 
and individual premium required in a large portfolio.
The inequality 퓁0(∞) ≤ w0(∞) will be strict whenever, as in our case, there is 
systematic risk. The extra capital w0(∞) − 퓁0(∞) provides then a buffer to cover the 
impact of such risk.
Property (2.5) is satisfied if the initial assets W0 are set according to a capital 
requirement criterion guaranteeing a given ruin probability, see Sect. 4. Property 
(2.6) holds for many premium calculation principles where the safety loading 
decreases with the portfolio size. In particular, it is automatically satisfied if one 
sets premiums using a portfolio based ruin criterion with a higher ruin probabil-
ity than that used to compute the assets, see Sect.  4. Of course, the case 
퓁0(∞) < w0(∞) might occur in a large portfolio without systematic insurance 
risk because of systematic financial risk. It also follows from (2.5) and (2.6) that 
N
N0
→ 휋Δ as N0 → +∞
(2.5)w0 →w0(∞) positive and finite
(2.6)퓁0 →퓁0(∞) ≤ w0(∞).
5 This result also holds under any probability measure equivalent to Q, in particular under the physical 
measure.
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훼 =
L0
W0
→ 훼(∞) =
퓁0(∞)
w0(∞)
≤ 1 . The fraction 훼(∞) represents the leverage ratio for 
an insurer supporting a large portfolio.
Under Assumption 3, the individual liability in the large portfolio case for the 
generic policyholder i is given, on the set {𝜏𝜏 i > T} , by
We conclude this section by observing that, if no systematic insurance risk affects 
our portfolio so that Δ is certain, then, by the law of large numbers,
almost surely. As all the insurance risk has been diversified away, there is no reason 
to allow for it when adjusting the physical measure in order to obtain the risk-neutral 
measure. Therefore, in the absence of both systematic and diversifiable insurance 
risk, these measures would coincide on events involving insurance risk only, while 
they may differ on financial related events. Furthermore, if the individual benefit is 
deterministic, as in case (a), our model could be framed within the original one by 
[11, 12].
2.4  Modelling financial risk
Since we are primarily concerned with demographic and asset risk, we disregard 
stochasticity in interest rates and assume that the market short rate is a constant, 
denoted by r. Then, the financial uncertainty in our model is only due to assets 
randomness. Beyond the natural requirement that financial and demographic 
related variables are independent, we do not make any specific assumption on 
the distribution of the assets value of the firm W under the pricing measure Q.
Assumption 4 The assets value W is independent of Δ and the residual lifetimes 
휏 i, i = 1,… ,N0.
In the large portfolio case, Assumption 4 holds for each sub-portfolio size N0.
(2.7)
퓁i(∞) = lim
N0→+∞
퓁i
=B + 훿훼(∞)
[
w0(∞)e
R
휋Δ
−
B
훼(∞)
]+
−
[
B −
w0(∞)e
R
휋Δ
]+
, i = 1, 2,… .
N
N0
→ Tpx as N0 → +∞
13
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3  Valuation
3.1  Finite portfolio case
Since all policyholders are homogeneous both in terms of benefits and survival 
probabilities, we consider now the individual liability of the generic policyholder 
and denote by V퓁
0
 its (initial) market value, given by:
The three components, Vg
0
 , Vb
0
 and Vd
0
 , correspond to the values of the guaranteed 
amount, bonus option and default option, respectively. We derive the above expecta-
tions in “Valuation formulae in the finite portfolio case” section in Appendix. The 
value of the total liability is
hence V퓁
0
=
VL
0
N0
.
A manipulation of the formulae in (3.1), see “Valuation formulae in the finite 
portfolio case” section in Appendix, shows that the values of the liability compo-
nents can be expressed in an alternative, yet meaningful, way:
where r̂(v) = r + Δm(v) can be interpreted as the mortality adjusted discount 
rate while N(i) = 1 +∑h≠i 1{𝜏𝜏h>T} is the number of survivors at time T on the set 
{𝜏𝜏 i > T} . Here W
N(i)
 represents the fraction of assets pertaining to the ith policyholder, 
assumed to be alive at time T. The value of each liability component is obtained as 
(3.1)
V퓁
0
=E
[
e−rT퓁i
]
=E[e−rTB1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}]
+ 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿E
[
e−rT
[
w −
B
𝛿𝛿
]+
1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}
]
− E
[
e−rT [B − w]+1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}
]
=V
g
0
+ 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿Vb
0
− Vd
0
, i = 1,… ,N0.
VL
0
= E
[
e−rTL
]
= E
[
e−rT
N0∑
i=1
퓁i
]
= N0V
퓁
0
,
(3.2)
V
g
0
=E
[
e− ∫ T0 r̂(v) dvB
]
,
Vb
0
=E
[
e− ∫ T0 r̂(v) dv
[
W
N(i)
−
B
훼
]+]
,
Vd
0
=E
[
e− ∫ T0 r̂(v) dv
[
B −
W
N(i)
]+]
,
14
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an expectation, under the risk-neutral measure Q, of its adjusted final payoff dis-
counted at the rate r̂  , see also [8, 9].
A contract is fair for the policyholders if the initial market value of the outstanding 
liabilities equates their initial investment. Alternatively, the contract is fair whenever 
the equity issuing price is equal to its market value. Fair contracts are then those for 
which
i.e., using (3.1), Vg
0
+ 훿훼Vb
0
− Vd
0
= 훼w0 . Fairness can therefore be defined at global 
or individual level.
It is particularly relevant to analyse the trade-off between contract parameters that 
implicitly define a fair policy. These parameters include the participation coefficient 
and, depending on the type of contract, the survival benefit, the annuity rate and the 
guaranteed annuity rate. Note that we can explicitly display the participation coefficient 
훿 associated with a fair contract as
while other fair parameters have to be searched for numerically. The fair participa-
tion coefficient 훿 attains its maximum value Q(N > 0)−1 when the individual guar-
anteed benefit B is 0, see Eq. (6.2). Then, in principle, the participation coefficient 
given by (3.3) could exceed 100%, in order to compensate for the low benefit and for 
the fact that, in the unlikely event that no policyholder survives maturity, the whole 
assets are passed to the equityholders, see (2.2). On the other hand, if the individual 
benefit is too high, the default option may be insufficient to compensate the high 
value of the guarantee and the right hand side of (3.3) could return a negative coef-
ficient. However, we only consider fair contracts for which the participation coeffi-
cient 훿 lies within the interval [0, 1].
3.2  Large portfolio case
Recalling from (2.7) the expression of the individual liability for the generic policy-
holder in an infinite portfolio, its value is given by
VL
0
= 훼W0 or, equivalently, V
퓁
0
= 훼w0,
(3.3)훿 =
훼w0 − V
g
0
+ Vd
0
훼Vb
0
,
V퓁
0
(∞) =E[e−rT퓁i(∞)]
=E[e−rTB1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}]
+ 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(∞)E
[
e−rT
[
w0(∞)e
R
𝜋𝜋Δ
−
B
𝛿𝛿(∞)
]+
1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}
]
− E
[
e−rT
[
B −
w0(∞)e
R
𝜋𝜋Δ
]+
1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}
]
=V
g
0
(∞) + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(∞)Vb
0
(∞) − Vd
0
(∞).
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The three liability components are computed in “Valuation formulae in the large 
portfolio case” section in Appendix. Again, it is possible to express them in an alter-
native way:
We remark that fairness of a contract in an infinitely large portfolio can only be 
defined at individual level. Fair contracts are then those for which
The fair participation coefficient has a similar expression to that in (3.3), namely
Once again, 훿(∞) reaches its maximum when B = 0 . However, this maximum is 
now equal to 1 as the extinction probability is 0. Then, if the guaranteed benefit 
is 0, policyholders and equityholders have proportional claims on the firm’s assets 
according to their initial contribution.
4  Ruin probability capital requirements
In this section we show how capital requirements and premiums can be calculated, 
under the physical measure, using a criterion based on the probability of ruin, and dis-
cuss their behaviour as the portfolio size diverges. To this end, denote by Q̃ the physical 
probability measure and recall that Q̃ and the pricing measure Q are equivalent. We sup-
pose that Assumptions 1, 2, 4 now hold under Q̃ , with the deterministic force of mortal-
ity m replaced by m̃ . We have therefore assumed that the stochastic force of mortality 
multiplicative structure is preserved under the change of measure, so that 휇̃t = Δm̃(t) 
for t > 0 . Although, in principle, we may have allowed both the deterministic force of 
mortality and the rescaling factor under Q to be different than those under Q̃ , here, for 
simplicity, we have maintained the same rescaling factor Δ and modified the determin-
istic force of mortality only. For a general discussion of change of measure and intensi-
ties in Cox processes, see [10] and, in the context of stochastic mortality, see [9].
Assume that the initial assets W0 are set according to the following ruin probabil-
ity criterion (see e.g. [23]):
V
g
0
(∞) =E
[
e− ∫ T0 r̂(v) dvB
]
,
Vb
0
(∞) =E
[
e− ∫ T0 r̂(v) dv
[
w0(∞)e
R
휋Δ
−
B
훼(∞)
]+]
,
Vd
0
(∞) =E
[
e− ∫ T0 r̂(v) dv
[
B −
w0(∞)e
R
휋Δ
]+]
.
V퓁
0
(∞) = 훼(∞)w0(∞).
(3.4)훿(∞) =
훼(∞)w0(∞) − V
g
0
(∞) + Vd
0
(∞)
훼(∞)Vb
0
(∞)
.
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where 휖 is the ruin probability. We recall that G = NB is the global benefit and 
W = W0e
R , with R the assets log-return over the period [0, T]. Hence initial assets 
are set by forcing the default event—the guaranteed global payoff cannot be covered 
by the final assets—to have a given confidence level.
Denote now by F̃R and Ẽ the cumulative distribution function of R, respectively 
the expectation operator, under Q̃ , and assume that R has a continuous distribution 
with support the real line. The ruin probability Eq. (4.1) can be rewritten, upon con-
ditioning on Δ and N, as
It is immediate to check that for each 0 < 𝜖𝜖 < 1 there exists a unique positive solu-
tion of (4.1), denoted W휖
0
 . The following proposition establishes some properties of 
W휖
0
 as a function of the portfolio size N0.
Theorem 1 The solution W휖
0
 of (4.1) satisfies the properties:
1. W휖
0
 is an increasing function of N0 , limN0→+∞W
휖
0
= +∞,
2. limN0→+∞
W휖
0
N0
= w0(∞), with 0 < w0(∞) < ∞.
The proof of Theorem 1 is reported in “Proof of Theorem 1” section in Appendix.
In the infinite portfolio case, the individual asset allocation can be computed by 
solving with respect to w0(∞) the equation obtained by taking the limit in (4.2), 
namely
with 휋̃ = e− ∫ T0 m̃(v)dv.
To fix the initial overall contribution L0 (or 퓁0(∞) ), one can choose a ruin prob-
ability 𝜖𝜖′ > 𝜖𝜖 and let L0 = W휖
�
0
 . Hence, the capital provided by equityholders allows 
to lower the ruin probability from the level 휖′ to 휖.
Expressions for the expectations in (4.2) and (4.3) are provided in “Proof of The-
orem 1” section in Appendix.
5  Numerical analysis
This section carries out a sensitivity analysis of the various contract components’ 
values as well as of the fair participation rates 훿 and 훿(∞) computed according to 
(3.3) and (3.4). The different contract features introduced in Sect. 2.1 are considered 
and compared.
(4.1)�Q(W < G) = 𝜖𝜖,
(4.2)Ẽ
[
F̃R
(
log
NB
W0
)]
= 휖.
(4.3)Ẽ
[
F̃R
(
log
휋̃ΔB
w0(∞)
)]
= 휖,
17
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5.1  Sensitivity analysis: large portfolio case
We begin our analysis with the large portfolio case. In particular, we are working 
under the pricing measure Q ≡ Q(∞) . We assume a deterministic Gompertz law of 
mortality m ≡ m(∞),
from which
We set
The values of 휆 and c were obtained by fitting the survival probabilities tp∗40 to the 
corresponding probabilities implied by the projected life table IPS55 in use in the 
Italian annuity market. The random variable Δ ≡ Δ(∞) is assumed to be Gamma dis-
tributed with var[Δ] = 0.1 while E[Δ] ∈ {0.4, 0.8, 1.2} , corresponding to different 
mortality pricing assumptions relative to various degrees of conservativeness.
We assume that R, the assets log-return over the interval [0, T], is normally 
distributed with mean (r − 휎2∕2)T  and standard deviation 휎
√
T  , so that 휎 is the 
assets volatility. Unless otherwise mentioned, we fix the following parameter 
m(t) = 휆cx+t, t ≥ 0,
s−tp
∗
x+t
= e−휆c
x(cs−ct)∕ log c, 0 ≤ t ≤ s.
x = 40, 휆 = 2.6743 × 10−5, c = 1.098.
Table 1  Case (b) for a large portfolio, different annuity rates 휌 and values of E[Δ]
휌 E[Δ] = 0.4 E[Δ] = 0.8 E[Δ] = 1.2
훿% V
g
0
V
b
0
V
d
0
훿% V
g
0
V
b
0
V
d
0
훿% V
g
0
V
b
0
V
d
0
5.0 90.28 43 48 3 95.69 33 57 1 97.65 28 63 1
7.5 69.16 65 33 11 85.11 50 42 5 91.33 42 49 3
10.0 32.76 87 23 22 66.14 67 31 11 79.64 56 38 7
12.5 – 108 17 36 37.33 84 24 20 61.63 70 30 13
15.0 – 130 12 52 – 100 18 30 36.41 84 24 20
Table 2  Case (b) for a large portfolio, different risk free rates r and values of E[Δ]
r% E[Δ] = 0.4 E[Δ] = 0.8 E[Δ] = 1.2
훿% V
g
0
V
b
0
V
d
0
훿% V
g
0
V
b
0
V
d
0
훿% V
g
0
V
b
0
V
d
0
1 – 196 6 108 – 140 10 59 – 113 15 39
2 – 129 13 52 8.17 97 19 28 45.47 79 25 17
3 32.76 87 23 22 66.14 67 31 11 79.64 56 38 7
4 76.54 59 36 8 87.93 47 45 4 92.75 40 51 2
5 92.21 40 50 3 95.96 33 57 1 97.60 28 62 1
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values, which we refer to as baseline case, and, for ease of notation, we suppress 
all dependencies on ∞:
• maturity T = 25;
• initial individual assets per contract w0 = 100;
• initial contribution ratio 훼 = 0.7;
• riskless rate r = 0.03;
• assets volatility 휎 = 0.15;
• in cases (a) and (c), individual survival benefit b = 150;
• in case (b), instantaneous annuity amount 휌 = 10;
• in case (c), guaranteed annuity rate ag ≐ 1∕휌g = 15.
5.1.1  Deferred annuities
Tables 1, 2 and 3 report the sensitivity of case (b) (deferred annuity) with respect 
to the parameters 휌 , r and 휎 and show how the different contract components are 
affected by systematic mortality changes.
As expected mortality rates shift downward, both the value of the guaranteed 
amount and the default option increase, while a reversed impact is observed on 
the value of the bonus option. Indeed, the insurance company is expected to pay 
a higher guaranteed amount because both survival probabilities and the annuity 
value aT are higher. This in turn implies a lower bonus payment. Overall, for the 
chosen parameters, the effect of a decrease in E[Δ] on the value of the guaranteed 
payment Vg
0
 dominates the other components appearing in (3.4), resulting in a lower 
participation rate. Furthermore, the impact of such a change becomes much more 
evident when combined with high annuity payments (see Table 1). When conserva-
tive pricing assumptions are adopted, too generous annuity rates are only compat-
ible with less appealing participation coefficients, outside the range 80–100% often 
practised in the past.6 Fair contracts may not even exist as, no matter how low is the 
participation rate, the value of the liabilities cannot match the initial policyholders’ 
Table 3  Case (b) for a large 
portfolio, different volatilities 휎 
and values of E[Δ]
The values of the guaranteed amount are Vg
0
= 87 for E[Δ] = 0.4 , 
V
g
0
= 67 for E[Δ] = 0.8 , Vg
0
= 56 for E[Δ] = 1.2
휎 E[Δ] = 0.4, E[Δ] = 0.8 E[Δ] = 1.2
훿% Vb
0
V
d
0
훿% Vb
0
V
d
0
훿% Vb
0
V
d
0
0.100 – 14 14 53.37 22 5 78.76 30 2
0.125 9.36 18 18 60.23 27 8 78.58 34 5
0.150 32.76 23 22 66.14 31 11 79.64 38 7
0.175 48.01 28 26 71.08 36 15 81.21 42 10
0.200 58.61 33 30 75.19 40 18 82.93 46 12
6 See for instance [11, 12].
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contribution. The right hand side of Eq. (3.4) produces then a negative value, imply-
ing that policyholders should actually transfer part of their assets to the equityhold-
ers to compensate for the increased risk. When this happens, the value of the fair 
participation coefficient 훿 in the tables is not displayed.
The higher the annuity payment 휌 , the lower is the fair participation coefficient 
훿 , as the insurance company is forced to compensate for the increasing cost of the 
deferred annuity Vg
0
 , which is proportional to 휌 . The extent of this variation prevails 
on the increased value of the default option Vd
0
 and the decreased bonus option value 
Vb
0
 . For conservative annuity rates, the bonus portion 훼훿Vb
0
 overweighs the other 
components and constitutes the most sizeable part of the total liability 훼w0.
When analysing the dependence on the market interest rate (see Table 2) simi-
lar patterns arise, although the effect of r on the different contract components is 
reversed. The value of the deferred annuity Vg
0
 and that of the default option Vd
0
 are 
depressed by an increase in the risk free rate, while the bonus (call) option value 
Vb
0
 increases. Once again, the guaranteed benefit outweighs the other components, 
resulting in more attractive participation coefficients. On the other hand, under low 
interest rate regimes comparable to those currently observed in many markets, the 
insurance company should apply rather uncompetitive participation rates, or may 
even be unable to offer fair contracts.
A change in the assets volatility only affects the optional contract components, 
both increasing with 휎 (see Table 3). However, in most instances, the increase in the 
default option overshadows that in the bonus option, resulting in richer fair partici-
pation coefficients. The opposite only occurs when no longevity improvements are 
expected and 휎 is extremely low, as default turns out to be very unlikely (under the 
risk neutral measure). Nonetheless, the participation coefficients remain in line with 
those commonly offered by insurance companies. When instead conservative mor-
tality assumptions are in place, the insurer may be tempted to seek highly volatile 
investment opportunities in order to keep the participation rates within reasonable 
bounds.
5.1.2  Pure endowments and guaranteed annuity options
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 report sensitivities in cases (a) and (c) with respect to the param-
eters b, ag , r and 휎 . In case (a) we only display the fair participation rate and the 
value of the guaranteed individual benefit. Recall that the individual benefit in case 
(c) can be decomposed into two parts: a pure endowment benefit as in case (a), and 
a guaranteed annuity option, see Sect. 2.1. The values of these liabilities are called 
V
g1
0
 , respectively Vg2
0
.
The results reported in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 help understanding the difference 
between cases (a) and (c). In general, the cost of adding a guaranteed annuity 
option to a pure endowment contract translates into lower participation coeffi-
cients, and the spread 훿(a) − 훿(c) measures the extra ‘premium’ required to pur-
chase such option. The values of the different liability components and the 
fair participation coefficients qualitatively share the same comparative stat-
ics observed in case (b) with respect to the mortality assumption. In particular, 
the guaranteed annuity option value Vg2
0
 is negligible unless some substantial 
20
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longevity improvements are foreseeable. Exceptions hold when exceedingly gen-
erous annuity conversion rates are offered or, more notably, under low interest 
rate regimes. When the guaranteed annuity option is valueless, there is practically 
no difference between cases (a) and (c) and the gap between the corresponding 
fair participation coefficients vanishes.
We note that the guarantee components Vg1
0
 and Vg2
0
 are proportional to the lump 
sum b. When expected longevity improvements are important, the participation 
coefficient spread widens as the lump sum benefit grows, see Table 4. Unlike case 
(a), fairness is not achievable in case (c) when a huge lump sum benefit is offered, as 
the default option value cannot compensate for the guaranteed annuity option cost.
A similar, more striking situation arises when too generous conversion condi-
tions are used (low levels of ag = 1∕휌g , see Table 5). It should be noted how the 
participation coefficient spread reacts to changes in the conversion rate. As soon as 
the annuity conversion option becomes valuable, the premium required to purchase 
such option takes off and may be unsustainable. Further, when conservative mortal-
ity assumptions are used, even offering very low conversion rates still incurs a cost.
The market interest rate affects directly annuity prices and therefore is the most 
important factor when discussing guaranteed annuity options. Table 6 is particularly 
interesting as it helps to single out the pricing scenarios under which the effect of 
interest rates is most relevant. First, when the market interest rate is 1% (or lower), 
fairness of the contract cannot be achieved for both the pure endowment and the 
guaranteed annuity option no matter how low is the share of profits which is released 
to policyholders, regardless of the mortality assumption. When longevity improve-
ments are anticipated and low to moderate interest rate regimes operate, then the 
‘perfect storm’ scenario is created as fairness can only be obtained at a huge cost 
in terms of lost share of profits passed back to policyholders, and this is much more 
the case when the conversion option is present. Both guarantee components strongly 
react to changes in r, and so do the option components. When instead interest rates 
are higher, the guaranteed annuity option becomes valueless and the different con-
tract components are insensitive to further interest rate rises.
Table 5  Cases (a) and (c) for a large portfolio, different guaranteed conversion rates ag and values of 
E[Δ]
In case (c), 훿(c) , Vg2
0
 , Vb
0
 and Vd
0
 are respectively the fair participation rate and the values of the guaranteed 
annuity option, bonus and default option. The fair participation rate in case (a) and the value of the guar-
anteed survival benefit in cases (a) and (c) are 훿(a) = 64.29 and Vg1
0
= 68 for E[Δ] = 0.4 ; 훿(a) = 68.59 and 
V
g1
0
= 65 for E[Δ] = 0.8 ; 훿(a) = 72.40 and Vg1
0
= 62 for E[Δ] = 1.2
a
g
E[Δ] = 0.4 E[Δ] = 0.8 E[Δ] = 1.2
훿(c)% V
g2
0
V
b
0
V
d
0
훿(c)% V
g2
0
V
b
0
V
d
0
훿(c)% V
g2
0
V
b
0
V
d
0
10.0 – 62 12 52 – 36 18 30 36.41 22 24 20
12.5 – 36 18 33 43.72 16 25 18 64.88 6 31 12
15.0 31.28 19 23 22 62.89 4 30 12 72.04 0 34 9
17.5 50.86 9 27 16 67.97 0 32 10 72.39 0 34 9
20.0 59.64 3 29 13 68.56 0 32 10 72.40 0 34 9
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Table 7  Cases (a) and (c) for a large portfolio, different volatilities 휎 and values of E[Δ]
훿(a) and 훿(c) are the fair participation rates for cases (a) and (c). Vb
0
 and Vd
0
 are the values of the bonus and 
default option in case (c). The values of the guaranteed survival benefit in cases (a) and (c) and of the 
guaranteed annuity option in case (c) are Vg1
0
= 68 and Vg2
0
= 19 for E[Δ] = 0.4 ; Vg1
0
= 65 and Vg2
0
= 4 for 
E[Δ] = 0.8 ; Vg1
0
= 62 and Vg2
0
= 0 for E[Δ] = 1.2
휎 E[Δ] = 0.4 E[Δ] = 0.8 E[Δ] = 1.2
훿(a)% 훿(c)% Vb
0
V
d
0
훿(a)% 훿(c)% Vb
0
V
d
0
훿(a)% 훿(c)% Vb
0
V
d
0
0.100 49.43 – 13 14 58.63 46.37 21 6 66.21 65.51 25 4
0.125 57.57 6.80 18 18 63.72 55.55 25 9 69.02 68.53 29 6
0.150 64.29 31.28 23 22 68.59 62.89 30 12 72.40 72.04 34 9
0.175 69.75 47.07 28 26 72.87 68.74 35 16 75.67 75.41 38 12
0.200 74.21 57.98 32 30 76.53 73.46 39 19 78.65 78.45 42 15
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Fig. 4  Fair participation coefficient 훿 in cases (a), (b) and (c) for different values of 훼 and E[Δ]
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Both option components of the liability Vb
0
 and Vd
0
 increase when the assets vola-
tility does, see Table 7. As in (b), the major effect in both cases (a) and (c) comes 
from the default option. Overall, the fair participation coefficient increases with 
the assets volatility, at least for the set of parameters considered here. For the pure 
endowment, the portion of extra profits transferred to policyholders always stays at 
reasonable levels. When the guaranteed annuity option is added to the contract and 
no longevity improvements are expected, the participation spread turns out to be 
very small and insensitive to volatility changes. If instead moderate to conservative 
mortality assumptions are in force, the corresponding cost in terms of missed partic-
ipation to profits can be substantial and even prevent the contract to attain fairness.
5.1.3  Role of the initial contribution ratio
Figure 4 displays the sensitivity of the fair participation rate 훿 with respect to the 
initial contribution ratio 훼 for the three contracts. We recall that case (c) differs from 
(a) due to the presence of the guaranteed annuity option, while (c) differs from (b) 
due to the surrender option. Then the spreads 훿(a) − 훿(c) and 훿(b) − 훿(c) give the extra 
cost, in terms of missed return of profits, required to add the corresponding option to 
the contract.
In all cases (a)–(c), the participation rate increases with the leverage ratio. Indeed, 
equityholders not only are entitled to a full participation on their quota 1 − 훼 of the 
assets, but also to an extra participation, at rate 1 − 훿 , of the share of assets 훼 held 
by policyholders. Therefore, the higher the leverage ratio, the smaller is the extra 
surplus participation rate yield by them in order to maintain fairness. In the limiting 
case of 훼 = 1 (a mutual company) then 훿 = 1 as policyholders are entitled to share 
all profits after benefits have been paid.
Under conservative mortality assumptions, there is practically no difference 
between cases (b) and (c), as keeping the guaranteed annuity provides a higher value 
compared to swapping for a lump sum payment. The surrender option is therefore 
negligible. On the other hand, the possibility of converting a lump sum into an annu-
ity at a guaranteed rate is greatly valuable. This situation is completely reversed 
when mortality is expected to worsen slightly, and cases (a) and (c) practically 
Table 8  Cases (a), (b) and (c) for a finite portfolio, different portfolio sizes and values of E[Δ]
훿(a) , 훿(b) and 훿(c) are the fair participation rates for cases (a), (b) and (c)
N0 E[Δ] = 0.4 E[Δ] = 0.8 E[Δ] = 1.2
훿(a)% 훿(b)% 훿(c)% 훿(a)% 훿(b)% 훿(c)% 훿(a)% 훿(b)% 훿(c)%
1 75.20 44.04 42.68 91.91 89.58 86.92 – – –
2 65.49 35.21 33.86 71.18 68.82 65.87 76.81 83.27 76.49
5 64.56 33.56 32.13 69.00 66.58 63.46 72.84 79.77 72.50
10 64.43 33.16 31.70 68.80 66.37 63.18 72.63 79.71 72.28
100 64.30 32.80 31.32 68.61 66.17 62.92 72.42 79.65 72.07
∞ 64.29 32.76 31.28 68.59 66.14 62.89 72.40 79.64 72.04
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coincide, so that the guaranteed annuity option is almost valueless, as previously 
pointed out. The surrender option instead is sizeable as, at maturity, it may be con-
venient to give up the annuity and obtain a cash payment. There are no fair contracts 
for low levels of 훼 , meaning that, as the guaranteed benefit is fixed, there is no way 
to compensate the low policyholders’ contribution by reducing their share of profits. 
When 훼 increases, the implied cost of the annuity conversion and surrender options 
decrease as a greater part of the benefits comes from participation to profits.
5.2  Sensitivity analysis: finite portfolio case
We move now to the case of finite portfolios. As the qualitative behaviour of the 
liability components with respect to contractual and market parameters follows the 
same pattern observed for large portfolios, we limit ourselves to report the fair par-
ticipation coefficient for different portfolio sizes and longevity assumptions in the 
baseline case (unless otherwise mentioned).
In Table 8, fair participation coefficients are calculated assuming that the pricing 
measure Q and the leverage ratio 훼 are independent of N0 , that is Q ≡ Q(N0) = Q(∞).
We notice that diversifiable risk can be eliminated even by pooling relatively small 
groups of policyholders, as large portfolios’ fair participation rates are achieved very 
soon. Although the portfolio sizes considered here may appear, at first sight, much 
lower than actual book dimensions, they are in line with the sizes of completely homo-
geneous sub-portfolios. The fair participation coefficients decrease with N0 for all types 
of benefits, with sizeable change when passing from N0 = 1 to N0 = 2 . In fact, if all 
policyholders die before maturity, the assets are entirely transferred to equityholders, 
see Equation (2.2). In a small portfolio, the likelihood of such event is not completely 
negligible and, to achieve fairness, equityholders must agree to release a larger share 
of profits to policyholders. In particular, in the limiting case of a single policyholder’s 
pool and slight mortality worsening, fairness cannot be achieved as, no matter how high 
the participation rate is, the initial contribution exceeds the market value of liabilities. 
The right hand side of (3.3) then produces a value greater than 100%. As the portfolio 
Table 9  Cases (a), (b) and (c) for different portfolio sizes, individual assets w0 and liabilities 퓁0 com-
puted using a ruin probability criterion, leverage ratio 훼 = 퓁0∕w0 and fair participation rate 훿
N0 Case (a) Case (b) Case (c)
w0 퓁0 훼% 훿% w0 퓁0 훼% 훿% w0 퓁0 훼% 훿%
1 127 88 68.74 — 123 84 68.53 — 130 89 68.70 —
2 123 84 68.72 82.54 118 81 68.45 78.17 125 86 68.66 80.25
5 120 83 69.38 80.81 116 80 69.05 76.27 123 85 69.30 78.43
10 120 83 69.66 80.91 115 80 69.31 76.33 122 85 69.58 78.52
100 119 83 69.92 81.04 115 80 69.55 76.44 122 85 69.83 78.65
∞ 119 83 69.95 81.05 115 80 69.58 76.45 122 85 69.86 78.66
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size grows, the extinction probability decreases and, therefore, fairness can be obtained 
through lower participation rates.
For the next example, we choose, as before, a pricing measure Q independent of the 
portfolio size N0 , but we set the initial individual assets w0 and liabilities 퓁0 accord-
ing to the ruin probability criterion described in Sect. 4. To this end we assume that 
the deterministic mortality intensity m̃ driving survival probabilities under the physical 
measure Q̃ is such that m = 훾m̃ , with 훾 = 0.9 . The risk neutral force of mortality m is 
then obtained through a proportional reduction of m̃ . Moreover, the systematic risk fac-
tor Δ has a Gamma distribution with variance ṽar[Δ] = 0.1 and expectation Ẽ[Δ] = 1 . 
Therefore, Ẽ[휇̃t] = m̃(t) and m̃ can be seen as a best estimate force of mortality. The 
instantaneous assets return is normally distributed with mean 5% , and standard devia-
tion 15%. Finally, to compute the initial assets per contract we fix a ruin probability, 
over the T = 25 years horizon, of 12.5% and, for the initial premium, of 25% . Roughly, 
if solvency were monitored on a yearly basis, these figures would correspond to an 
annual ruin probability of 0.53% for the assets and 1.14% for the initial contribution. In 
Table 9 we display the initial assets w0 , contributions 퓁0 , leverage ratios 훼 = 퓁0∕w0 and 
fair participation coefficients 훿 for different portfolio sizes N0 . The latter are computed 
assuming for the rescaling factor Δ , under the pricing measure Q, a Gamma distribu-
tion with mean E[Δ] = 0.8 and variance var[Δ] = 0.1 and same assets volatility as 
under the physical measure Q̃.
As expected, both initial assets and contributions decrease with portfolio size, 
reflecting the diversification benefit. The corresponding leverage ratio appears to be 
remarkably stable, even for small portfolios. Adjusting capital and premiums to the size 
of the pool implies smoother fair participation rates as compared to those in Table 8. 
Again, in the limiting case of a single policyholder’s pool, fair contracts cannot be 
achieved even under moderate longevity improvement assumptions.
Finally, as a last example, we fix assets and liabilities as in the baseline case, but 
adjust the pricing measure Q(N0) to reflect the portfolio size. To keep things simple, we 
assume that under Q(N0) the stochastic force of mortality is 휇(N0)t = m(t)Δ(N0) , so that we 
keep the same deterministic intensity as in the large portfolio case and adjust the sys-
tematic rescaling factor Δ(N0) . More precisely, under Q(N0) , we take for Δ(N0) a Gamma 
distribution with the same variance as in the baseline case and expectation tied to the 
portfolio size according to the following specification:
E(N0)[Δ(N0)] = E(∞)[Δ(∞)]휙(N0),
Table 10  Fair participation 
rates 훿 for cases (a), (b) and (c) 
with different portfolio sizes 
and size-adjusted risk neutral 
measures, E(∞)[Δ(∞)] = 0.8
N0 휙(N0)% 훿
(a)% 훿(b)% 훿(c)%
1 50 75.20 44.04 42.68
2 67 67.40 50.89 49.32
5 83 67.59 59.30 57.08
10 91 68.05 62.64 60.00
100 99 68.53 65.79 62.60
∞ 100 68.59 66.14 62.89
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where 휙(N0) =
N0
N0+1
 . This formulation allows for an adjustment of the systematic 
risk factor that vanishes as the portfolio size increases. The correction with respect 
to Q(∞) is stronger for small portfolios, where diversifiable insurance risk weighs 
more. In the limiting case of a single policyholder, the effect of the adjustment is to 
halve the (expected) stochastic mortality, resulting in an extremely prudential liabili-
ties assessment. Then, as N0 (and E(N0)[Δ(N0)] ) increases, there are, in all cases (a)-
(c), two opposite effects on the fair participation rate. On one hand, as the portfolio 
size grows the participation rate is pushed down, as it happens in Table 8 when we 
move downward along a given column. On the other hand, the increase in 
E(N0)[Δ(N0)] has a positive effect on 훿 , as it happens in Table 8 when we move right-
ward along a given row.
In particular, the single policyholder portfolio case in Table  10 corresponds to 
the leftmost columns, top row, of Table 8. Conversely, the large portfolio case corre-
sponds to the central columns, bottom row, of Table 8. Looking at cases (b) and (c) 
in Table 10, as the portfolio size grows the adjustment to the survival rates prevails 
over the decrease in the extinction probability, resulting in higher fair participation 
coefficients. The opposite pattern occurs in case (a) for N0 ≤ 2 , while, for larger 
pools, the gain in probability extinction exhausts its effects and the fair participa-
tion rate remains stable. This different behaviour of cases (b) and (c) with respect to 
case (a) is due to the fact that individual benefits of the annuity-type highly depend 
on the mortality assumption, unlike pure endowment-type benefits. This is apparent 
from Table 8 when comparing the results in cases E[Δ] = 0.4 and E[Δ] = 0.8 . The 
percentage increase in the fair participation coefficients in (b) and (c) is substantial 
and remarkably stable for any portfolio size. In case (a) the corresponding increase 
is moderate and comparatively low for N0 > 2.
6  Concluding remarks
This paper aims at shedding some light on the interplay between two key risk fac-
tors affecting most life insurance products, namely biometric and investment risk. 
We enhance the pioneering model by [11, 12], featuring a stylized participating life 
insurance company by explicitly tying benefits to the survivorship of a cohort of pol-
icyholders. In particular, we allow for the two main components of biometric risk, 
that is systematic (longevity) risk and diversifiable (process) risk. The former stems 
from the uncertainty surrounding future survival rates affecting all policyholders at 
once, the latter is due to the specific mortality risk associated with each policyholder 
and can be eliminated after pooling together portfolios of homogeneous contracts.
A first result of our analysis is that systematic risk overshadows process risk even 
for small portfolios. This fact is not surprising since longevity risk has been recog-
nized as one of the most challenging factors affecting the life insurance business. 
During the last few decades, demographers and actuaries have made a great effort in 
trying to develop sound stochastic mortality models that capture trend and variabil-
ity of survival rates over time. Our base mortality model could then be enhanced by 
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employing a more realistic, dynamic approach. However, we feel that the qualitative 
nature of our findings will be preserved.
One of the main consequences of the credit crunch crisis has been the transition 
to a long-lasting phase of extremely low interest rate regimes in many developed 
countries. This has put some severe strain on life insurers’ balance sheets by sensibly 
inflating the market value of liabilities, even though interest rates are expected to 
rise again in the near future. We have decided, mostly to preserve the simplicity of 
the model, to consider constant non-random interest rates. Nonetheless, our results 
are quite worrying as they show that, under low interest rate levels, yet not even 
close to those currently experienced, the cost of guarantees offered may be hardly 
sustainable. A further dimension could then be added by allowing for fluctuations 
in interest rates through one of the many stochastic term structure models available.
Finally, to keep the transparency of our model to a reasonable level, we have 
focused on a static, one period approach involving a closed cohort of policyholders 
and a terminal bonus rate which is decided at the onset. Clearly, a deeper analy-
sis would result from considering the life insurance company as a going concern, 
including features such as writing new business, setting reversionary bonuses, 
checking dynamically solvency and updating pricing rules and capital requirements. 
However, all these aspects could be introduced at the cost of missing some clarity in 
the results and are left for future research.
Appendix
Properties of 흉
i
 and N
Law of 휏
i
The survival probability of a policyholder is given by
where ℒΔ is the moment-generating function of Δ , i.e. ℒΔ(y) = E[eΔy].
Ordering between 휏
i
 and 휏∗
Proposition 1 If E[Δ] ≤ 1 then 휏i is greater than 휏∗ in the hazard rate order.
Proof We need to show that the ratio tpx∕tp∗x is nondecreasing with t. For t < s , we 
have
tpx = Q(𝜏𝜏
i > t) = E
[
e−Δ ∫ t0 m(v)dv
]
=ℒΔ
(
log tp
∗
x
)
,
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since the function (z) = Δ(log z)∕z , 0 < z ≤ 1 , is nonincreasing when E[Δ] ≤ 1 
as can be seen by inspecting its derivative:
  □
Law of N
The number of survivors N has, conditionally on Δ , a binomial distribution:
Consequently, the unconditional law of N is a mixture of binomial distribu-
tions. Denoting by FΔ the cumulative distribution function of Δ , we have, for 
j = 0, 1,… ,N0,
where bin(j;M, p) =
(
M
j
)
pj(1 − p)M−j is the mass function of a Binomial random 
variable with parameters M ≥ 1 and 0 < p < 1.
Market value of the unitary annuity
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the market value of the unitary annuity aT is
where the function a is given by:
spx
sp
∗
x
−
tpx
tp
∗
x
=(sp∗x ) −(tp∗x ) ≥ 0,
z2�(z) = E[zΔ(Δ − 1)] = Cov(zΔ,Δ) + E[zΔ]E[Δ − 1] ≤ 0.
N ∼ Binomial
(
N0, e
−Δ ∫ T
0
m(v)dv
)
.
Q(N = j) = E
[
bin
(
j;N0,휋
Δ
)]
= ∫
∞
0
bin
(
j;N0,휋
l
)
FΔ(dl),
aT = E
[
�
∞
T
e−r(s−T)1{𝜏𝜏 i>s}ds
|||𝜏𝜏 i > T , Δ
]
= �
∞
T
e−r(s−T)Q
(
𝜏𝜏 i > s
|||𝜏𝜏 i > T , Δ)ds
= �
∞
T
e−r(s−T)e−Δ ∫ sT m(v)dvds
= a(Δ),
30
286 A. R. Bacinello et al.
1 3
Note that a(l) is the value of a continuous annuity with force of mortality l m.
Valuation formulae in the finite portfolio case
We denote by C(A, r, T, K) and P(A, r, T, K) the values at time 0 of a European call, 
respectively put, option written on the assets of the firm, when time to maturity is T, 
initial assets value is A, (fixed) interest rate is r and strike is K.
Note that the individual benefit B is a function of Δ , say B = 훽(Δ) , where
Market value of the guaranteed amount
Conditioning on Δ , it follows that
Market value of the bonus option
Recalling that N(i) = 1 +∑h≠i 1{𝜏𝜏h>T} is independent of 휏 i conditionally on Δ and that 
W is independent of all biometric related factors, we have
By further conditioning on N(i) the inner expectation and exploiting again Assump-
tion 4,
a(l) = ∫
∞
T
e−r(s−T)
(
s−Tp
∗
x+T
)l
ds.
훽(l) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
b in case (a)
휌 a(l) in case (b)
bmax{1, 휌ga(l)} in case (c)
.
(6.1)
V
g
0
=E[e−rTB1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}]
=e−rTE
[
B𝜋𝜋Δ
]
=e−rT ∫
∞
0
𝛽𝛽(l)𝜋𝜋lFΔ(dl).
Vb
0
=E
[
e−rT
[
w −
B
𝛼𝛼
]+
1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}
]
=E
[
𝜋𝜋ΔE
[
e−rT
[
W
N(i)
−
B
𝛼𝛼
]+||Δ]].
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where the last equation is obtained after multiplying and dividing by j
N0
.
Note that Eq. (6.2) immediately highlights the valuation formula for the aggregate 
bonus option N0Vb0.
Market value of the default option
Manipulations similar to those in “Market value of the bonus option” section can be 
used to obtain the following expression for the default option value:
Valuation formulae in the large portfolio case
Recall that now FΔ and E refer to the cumulative distribution function, respectively 
expectation operator, under the probability Q = Q∞.
Market value of the guaranteed amount
This is formally the same expression as in the case of a finite portfolio, Eq. (6.1):
Market value of the bonus option
Conditioning on Δ and exploiting the independence between financial and demographic 
factors, we obtain
(6.2)
Vb
0
=E
[
휋ΔE
[
C
(
W0
N(i)
, r, T ,
B
훼
)|Δ]]
=∫
∞
0
휋l
N0∑
j=1
C
(
W0
j
, r, T ,
훽(l)
훼
)
bin
(
j − 1;N0 − 1,휋
l
)
FΔ(dl).
=
1
N0 ∫
∞
0
N0∑
j=1
C
(
W0, r, T ,
j훽(l)
훼
)
bin
(
j;N0,휋
l
)
FΔ(dl),
Vd
0
=E
[
e−rT [B − w]+1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}
]
=
1
N0 ∫
∞
0
N0∑
j=1
P
(
W0, r, T , j𝛽𝛽(l)
)
bin
(
j;N0,𝜋𝜋
l
)
FΔ(dl).
V
g
0
(∞) =E[e−rTB1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}]
=e−rT ∫
∞
0
𝛽𝛽(l)𝜋𝜋lFΔ(dl).
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Market value of the default option
Similarly as in “Market value of the bonus option” section, we have:
Results relative to Sect. 4
Proof of Theorem 1
1. Write N(N0) to stress the dependence of N on N0 . Note that N(N0+1) ≥ N(N0) almost 
surely and �Q
(
N(N0+1) > N(N0)
)
> 0 . It follows that W휖
0
 increases with N0 . If the 
limit of W휖
0
 as N0 → +∞ were finite, then, as N(N0) → +∞ a.s., we would have 
 contradicting (4.2).
2. Recall first that N(N0)∕N0 → �𝜋𝜋Δ > 0 and note that B > 0 . If W휖0∕N0 → w0(∞) then 
the expectation in (4.2) converges to 
 As this limit is also equal to 휖 ∈ (0, 1) , it follows that 0 < w0(∞) < +∞ . Denote 
explicitly W휖
0
(N0) the solution of (4.2) with respect to N0 . To prove that the limit 
of W휖
0
(N0)∕N0 exists, suppose there are two subsequences (N�0) and (N��0 ) such 
that 
Vb
0
(∞) =E
[
e−rT
[
w0(∞)e
R
𝜋𝜋Δ
−
B
𝛼𝛼(∞)
]+
1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}
]
=E
[
C
(
w0(∞)
𝜋𝜋Δ
, r, T ,
B
𝛼𝛼(∞)
)
𝜋𝜋Δ
]
=∫
∞
0
C
(
w0(∞), r, T ,
𝛽𝛽(l)𝜋𝜋l
𝛼𝛼(∞)
)
FΔ(dl).
Vd
0
(∞) = E
[
e−rT
[
B −
w0(∞)e
R
𝜋𝜋Δ
]+
1{𝜏𝜏 i>T}
]
= ∫
∞
0
P
(
w0(∞), r, T , 𝛽𝛽(l)𝜋𝜋
l
)
FΔ(dl).
Ẽ
[
F̃R
(
log
NB
W0
)]
→ 1,
Ẽ
[
F̃R
(
log
휋̃ΔB
w0(∞)
)]
.
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 with 0 < w�
0
(∞) < w��
0
(∞) <∞ . Taking the limit in the expectation (4.2) under 
the two subsequences leads to two different limits while (4.2) states that both 
limits should coincide with 휖.
Calculation of W휖
0
For a finite portfolio, the expectation in (4.2) can be computed by
In the infinite portfolio case, the expectation in (4.3) can be calculated by
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